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INTRODUCTION

In this second issue of Volume 70, The Survey analyzes recent developments in New York law. In Anne R. v. Francis C.,
the Family Court, Queens County, held that post-death DNA
tests on a decedent's frozen blood samples were admissible
where the decedent's blood was drawn prior to his death. The
court noted that the petitioner in Anne R. had established
standing to bring the paternity action by proving the decedent
had openly acknowledged the child as his own. In this case,
where the decedent's blood was drawn prior to death, the order
of blood genetic testing was reasonable. The writer asserts that
statutory classifications that do not allow illegitimate children to
prove paternity are violative of the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment and illegitimate children should be
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able to utilize posthumous DNA testing,.
In Siemens Credit Corp. v. Marvik Colour, Inc., the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York
adopted a novel approach granting a creditor who failed to comply with the notice and reasonableness requirements of section
9-504(3) of the New York Commercial Code a right to a deficiency judgment. The Siemens Credit court combined the varying approaches utilized by the departments of the New York Appellate Division. The court applied a combination of the
rebuttable presumption and set-off rules and held that a creditor's noncompliance does not absolutely bar a deficiency judgment. The writer proposes an amendment to the New York
Commercial Code codifying the approach adopted in Siemens
Credit.
In People v. Sanders, the New York Court of Appeals held
that in order to admit evidence under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule, the prosecution must either produce or
demonstrate the unavailability of the declarant. Subsequent to
the Sanders decision, the United States Supreme Court in
United States v. Inadi held that the unavailability requirement
did not apply to the coconspirator exception, reasoning that such
statements derive their indicia of reliability from the context in
which they were made. Since the Supreme Court's ruling in Inadi, lower courts in New York have struggled over the applicability of the Sanders rule. In addition, the lower courts are now
struggling with whether the unavailability rule should be applied to other hearsay exceptions.
Finally, in People v. Letterlough, the New York Court of Appeals held that requiring a defendant convicted of driving while
intoxicated to affix a "CONVICTED DWI" sign on any vehicle he
drove failed to meet the primary purposes of probation. The
court held that making a "CONVICTED DWI" sign a condition of
defendant's probation was both punitive and deterrent and not
reasonably related to the primary purpose of probation, namely
rehabilitation. The writer contends that the Letterlough court's
interpretation of probation under Penal Law section 65.10 restricts trial judges' ability to use creative sentencing as a method
of probation.
The members of Volume 70 hope that this review of New
York case law and legislative developments will be of interest to
both the bench and the bar.

